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A Social Network Approach to
Understanding an Insurgency
BRIAN REED

T

he study of networks, interactions, and relationships has a long history in
academia. The different forms and methods of study have varied over the
years and the ideas pertaining to these studies have been shaped by scholars
from various fields. A network analysis of war and insurgency differs markedly from conventional approaches, a fact that might require us to rethink
some of our more conventional analytical tools. War, as an extension of both
policy and politics with the addition of military force, takes different forms
across the spectrum of conflict. Insurgencies are one element of this spectrum. Each insurgency is unique. Few fit neatly into any rigid classification.
However, interconnectedness is a new aspect related to the current wave of
insurgencies. Insurgents now link with other groups throughout the state, region, or world by joining organizations that have a common objective.
Attacking these networks can be extremely difficult. Defeating a
networked enemy requires a capability that possesses an array of linked
resources necessary to sustain it. Conventional military thinking and strategies do not always permit such a response. No longer can analysts use just an
organizational chart to describe an enemy’s configuration. Today it is much
more difficult for a commander to differentiate the enemy from members of
the general populace. The commander can no longer expect to face a single,
consistent leader running a subordinate organization exhibiting a coherent
pattern of activity.
A network analysis approach affords today’s analysts and strategists
a new way of thinking. Such a dramatic shift in how we think can be difficult
for organizations and individuals to assimilate. The characteristics of social
network analysis is often counter-intuitive to traditional military thinking,
rooted in the efficiency of a hierarchy that demonstrates a strong set of baseSummer 2007
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line norms and subordination. Network analysis requires that we consider
linkages between people, groups, units, and organizations.

Social Network Analysis
Social network analysts start with the simple yet powerful notion
that the primary business of social scientists is to study social structure.
They believe that the most direct way to study a social structure is to analyze
the patterns of ties linking its members. 1 The fundamental difference between a social network explanation of a process and a non-network explanation is the inclusion of concepts and information on relationships among
units in a study. Network analysis operationalizes structures in terms of network linkages among units. Regularities or patterns in interactions give rise
to structures. The social network perspective views characteristics of the social units as arising out of structural or relational processes and focuses on
properties of the relational systems. The task is to understand properties of
the social, economic, or political structural environment and how these
structural properties influence observed characteristics and associations related to the characteristics. Standard social science perspectives usually ignore relational information. 2
Using a social network analysis perspective, the social environment can be expressed as patterns or regularities in relationships among
interacting units.3 There are normally several goals related to these relationships. 4 One goal is to visualize the relationships between actors and to
uncover structure. A second goal is to study the factors that influence
relationships, i.e., age, cultural background, previous training of those involved, or to study the strength of relationships. Third is to draw implications from the relational data, including bottlenecks where multiple
information flows funnel through one person or organization. These are
situations where information flow does not match formal group structure,
and individuals who execute key roles may not be formally recognized by
the organization. A fourth goal is to make recommendations that will improve communication and workflow in an organization.

Lieutenant Colonel Brian Reed has served in a variety of command and staff positions. He is currently Commander, 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry at Fort Wainwright,
Alaska. Lieutenant Colonel Reed has a Bachelor of Science from the US Military Academy and a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Maryland. He is a co-author of the
appendix on “Social Network Analysis” in the new edition of Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency.
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Those who have used the notion of social networks to analyze relationships and linkages have found it necessary to distinguish certain features or
characteristics of these networks as germane to the explanation of the behavior
being sought. Essentially, there are two categories of characteristics: morphological and interactional. The morphological characteristics of personal networks refer to the “shape of the individual’s network.” These may be equated
with the structural aspects of social behavior—the relationship or patterning of
the links in the network in relation to one another. The interactional criteria refer to the nature of the links themselves—the behavior of individuals vis-à-vis
one another.5 By understanding why relationships exist between actors and
how actors interact, the analyst is afforded a window into the inner workings of
the network.
Social network analysis provides a precise method to define important social concepts, a theoretical alternative to the assumption of independent social actors, and a framework for testing theories regarding structured social relationships.6 Equally relevant is the understanding of a social
network approach to assessing power and its distribution in organizations.
Structural perspectives on power argue that it is derived from each person’s
position in the division of labor and the communication system of the
organization.
The division of labor in an organization creates subunits and differentiated roles, and each subunit or position develops specialized interests and
responsibilities. There is also the possibility that each subunit or position will
make claims on the organization’s resources. In the contest for resources
those who do well succeed on the basis of the resources they control as well as
their ties with individuals who influence the allocation of resources. Control
over resources, and the importance of the unit in the organization, are derived
from the division of labor that affords specific positions or groups more control over critical tasks. Power comes from the control over resources, the ties
one has to powerful others, and the formal authority individuals obtain because of their position in the network. 7
The knowledge that produces power in organizations is not only
technical and related to the work process, but also the knowledge of the organization’s social system or structure. 8 People who are well placed in the communication network tend to be the central players in terms of power and
influence. Consequently, we can determine that power is a function of one’s
position in the network of communications and social relations. Certainly,
this is true when a position is assessed in terms of structural centrality and the
power of the people with whom one is connected.
The preceding discussion provides a baseline description of social
network analysis and a basic explanation of how it differs from a nonSummer 2007
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networked perspective. Prior to elaborating on how social network analysis
helps us understand and cope with an adversary, an explanation of what that
adversary looks like and the evolving nature of insurgent warfare is in order.

Insurgent Warfare . . . Adding to the Continuing Debate
Low intensity conflict and guerrilla warfare have been more prevalent throughout the history of warfare than conventional war. 9 The essential
features of guerrilla warfare—avoiding the enemy’s strengths, clever use of
the terrain, and striking at outposts and logistical support centers from unexpected locations—have changed little since the days of the Romans and Persians. What has changed is the addition of revolutionary thinking that has
made guerrilla warfare a potent form of conflict for the accomplishment of
political objectives.10
Present-day views of an insurgency are based on an interpretation of
the classic texts of insurgent warfare and the history of wars of national liberation from the late 20th century.11 The basic tenets of this form of warfare are
found in the writings of past practitioners such as Mao Tse-Tung. Mao saw
revolutionary war as protracted and organized into three phases: the initial
phase of organization, consolidation, and preservation in which the insurgents builds political strength; a second phase of progressive expansion as the
insurgents gain strength and consolidate control; and a final decisive phase
when the leadership commits regular forces (which have been carefully husbanded to this point) culminating in the enemy’s destruction.12 Mao also
called for clearly defined political goals and established political responsibility. As the first practitioner to define insurgency, Mao understood that war is
essentially a political undertaking and that political mobilization was the
most fundamental ingredient for winning the war.13
The question arises, then, as to whether this view of insurgency is in
keeping with the realities of 21st century insurgent warfare. As one examines
the existing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the overarching Global War
on Terrorism, does the classical definition and understanding of revolutionary warfare square with present-day scenarios? The underlying premise of
this article is that the past and the present are not so different. Features of historical insurgencies are evident today, most notably the emphasis on defeating the political will of the enemy rather than defeating the enemy’s army by
means of direct combat. Like those that came before, the insurgent leaders are
committed for the long haul in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and other
places where the war on terrorism is being waged.
There is distinctiveness, however, to what we are witnessing in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Such a model is a revision of what happened in previous in22
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surgent warfare experiences. Precipitated by failure of individual states, we
see non-state actors organized (albeit loosely) across territorial boundaries
and operating along pre-existing structural linkages that have been adapted to
wage insurgent warfare. Additionally, in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan an
external foreign power is attempting to restore order and governance in a
country that was not a former colony. Simplistically, this phenomenon is reflected in Figure 1.
STATE
FAILURE

+

GUERRILLA
INSURGENCY

+

EXTERNAL
POWER

=

IRAQ . . . and
OTHERS

Figure 1. Formula for Insurgent Warfare

State Failure
Potentially, one of the primary centers of disorder in the 21st century
will be failed states; areas where the state has either disappeared or simply become one more criminal gang.14 These areas represent the future for much of
the world. Just as some cultures are likely to be centers of order, others will be
centers or sources of disorder. Insurgent networks thrive on disorder.
State failure is “a process by which the state loses the capacity or the
will to perform its fundamental governance and security functions.” 15 Failing
or failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. Such environments can host
destructive networks and various forms of ideological insurgencies. The contemporary, global security environment reflects numerous examples of this
general lack of legitimate governance and civil-military cooperation. Instability flourishes under these conditions.
As important as instability might be to a national or transnational
threat environment, an equally important consideration is to remember that it
is only a symptom—not the actual threat. The ultimate threat is failure of the
state.16 When examining this threat the most insidious security problem facing the nations of the world today centers on the threat to a nation-state’s ability and willingness to secure and control its territory, along with the actions of
non-state actors seeking violent change within that nation-state.17
The greatest security challenge today and for the near future is the
combination of failing states and regional insecurity, having worldwide repercussions, and supporting the rise of terrorism. The essence, then, of contemporary warfare is asymmetry—an asymmetry of will and means. 18 The
enemy adjusts by employing unconventional strategies such as insurgent or
terrorist attacks. The enemy in these contemporary conflicts is network
based, flexible, and transnational in scope. 19
Summer 2007
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Guerrilla Insurgency
The modern insurgency is characterized by non-state actors, linked
by pre-existing ties (religion, family, or tribe) that are adapted to support insurgent warfare.20 Such actors are intent not only on short-term goals, but possess the desire to make a long-term difference. The aims these non-state
actors adopt and the resources they employ are governed not only by the characteristics related to their own movement, they are also representative of the
spirit of the period and its general character.21 This spirit and character are defined by an unorthodox or asymmetric, networked approach aimed not at winning by the conventional defeat of the enemy’s armed forces, but rather, by
directly influencing the political will of decisionmakers. Such conflicts are
almost certain to be lengthy, measured in decades rather than months or years.
Revolutionary coalitions tend to form around pre-existing nationalism, populism, or religions capable of aggregating a broad array of social
classes. Such organizations may also offer selective incentives to encourage
participation in various activities, particularly dangerous ones such as guerilla
warfare. It is the ongoing provision of collective and selective goods, not ideological conversion in the abstract, that plays a principal role in solidifying social support for insurgents. 22
While pre-existing ties are the foundation, it is a common interest in
addition to the institutional means to pursue it that serves as the catalysts for
creating a collective identity that allows a group to embrace collective action.23 Collective identities draw conceptual boundaries around the genus of
individuals who are similarly affected by specific circumstances. However,
these conceptual maps only apply when pre-existing social ties are in place.
The dual role of these social relations—as a means for assessing the validity
of a collective identity, and as a means for action, or influencing others to
act—accounts for the fact that formal and informal ties act together in the mobilization and unity of effort.24
The full functioning of a network depends on how well, and in what
ways, the members are personally known and connected to each other. This is
the classic level of social network analysis, where strong personal ties, often
ones that rest on friendship and bonding experiences, ensure high degrees of
trust and loyalty. To function well, networks may require higher degrees of interpersonal trust than do other approaches to organization, like hierarchies.
Kinship ties, be they of blood or brotherhood, are a fundamental aspect of
many terrorist, criminal, and gang organizations.
External Power
Within the current insurgency model, a key variable is the presence of
an external power and its efforts to restore order and governance following fail24
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ure of the state, as the result of internal strife or military intervention. In the
case of Iraq, arguably, what we are witnessing is a social revolution.25 A revolution that could not have happened without a breakdown of the administrative
and coercive powers of the previous regime.26 Coalition forces are overseeing
the transformation and reconstitution of the state, with the United States as the
primary engineer. Such a transformation is atypical of social revolutions where
the reconstitution of state organizations is driven from within—for example,
France, Russia, China, and Iran.27
The basic condition for the occurrence of a revolution is normally an
emergence from within a particular society initiated by individuals or groups
with a common cause, uniting leaders and followers, aimed at the overthrow of
existing political and social order.28 Revolutions by nature are complex and
multidimensional. The insurgency we see in Iraq is the result of a social revolution, precipitated by an external power. In any revolutionary crisis, differentially situated and motivated groups become participants in complex, multiple
conflicts that ultimately give rise to outcomes not originally foreseen or intended by any of the groups involved.29 Hence, witness the rise of the insurgent
resistance following the fall of Baghdad. Like the classic cases mentioned previously, success in Iraq and other conflicts will depend on the leadership. In
Iraq we have the coalition-sponsored Iraqi government that counts on the exercise of popular political mobilizations for state-building purposes: the creation
of armies, systems of governance, and administrative controls and oversight. 30
Historically, the comparative analysis of directly and indirectly
ruled colonies has shown that the latter have been much less vulnerable to defeat and displacement by revolutionary forces. 31 Indirectly ruled colonies are
those where an external power sponsors indigenous elites to whom it can
gradually cede power without disrupting administrative or military institutions. For example, following World War II, in Malaya and the Philippines,
British and American victors governed in conjunction with indigenous elites
to whom national sovereignty was eventually ceded. During and after the
transition to independence, the governments of Malaya and the Philippines
were able to use military force and limited reforms to defeat and contain communist guerrillas.32 This is generally the route the United States is taking in
present-day Iraq. The transfer of sovereignty and national elections have already occurred with a goal of eventually withdrawing US and coalition forces
once the Iraqi government and military are capable of defeating or containing
the insurgency.
Iraq . . . and Others
In an attempt to analyze the situation in Iraq, one must always be
cognizant of the fact that a tribal society already has at its disposal affiliated
Summer 2007
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social, economic, and military networks easily adaptable to warfighting. The
methods by which insurgents are exploiting tribal networks does not represent an evolved form of insurgency, but rather, it is an expression of inherent
cultural and social customs. The social dynamic that sustains the ongoing
conflict in Iraq is best understood when considered in terms of tribal allegiances. It is the traditional tribal network that offers insurgents a readymade
insurrectionary infrastructure.33
In places such as Iraq or Afghanistan, kinship historically has provided a vehicle for political organization. It has delineated conditions for individuals to come together and cooperate. In particular, kinship ties have
served as a basis for political action and collective defense. 34 For example,
news about Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network reveal their dependence on personal relationships formed over the years with “Afghan Arabs”
from Egypt and elsewhere who were committed to Islamic fundamentalism
and terrorism against the United States. 35
While not necessarily unique, this model is distinctive because it
takes into consideration a networked enemy organized across territorial
boundaries and borders. The fact that the organization on the surface appears
to be loose, there is an ideological connection between al Qaeda operations in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and the Philippines. To date, it is uncertain as to
exactly how many insurgent groups actually exist in the Iraq theater of operations. Are the groups united and working together, or are they fractured and
purely focused on individual goals and objectives? Regardless, all these
groups appear to have in common the ouster of the US-led coalition and the
failure of a democratically based Iraqi government. Arguably, such a goal is
consistent with the objectives of other insurgent groups waging revolutionary
war in other locations against US forces.
The rise of these networks means that power is migrating to nonstate actors, primarily because such actors are capable of organizing into
sprawling, multi-organizational networks more readily than traditional, hierarchical, state-actors. There is also a new category of sovereignty-free
actors.36 Multinational corporations, ethnic groups, bureaucratic agencies,
ideologies, transnational societies, political parties, international organizations, and even sub-national social movements inhabit this realm. These entities are not bound by the traditional concerns of states, yet they have
sufficient resources to initiate global action on their own authority and influence the course of global affairs.37
A series of networked enclaves might become a dominant political
actor within a particular state or group of states. Thus, rather than by directly
competing with a nation-state, an unconventional non-state actor can indirectly co-opt and seize control of a state. 38 This may occur if the unconven26
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tional attacker—terrorists, drug cartels, criminal gangs, or a combination of
such actors—utilizes crime, terrorism, direct combat, or other strategies to
gain influence. This problem is compounded if the attacker has access to advanced technologies in addition to conventional weapons. The attacker can
then transcend traditional criminal activity and pose a significant challenge
to the nation-state and its institutions. Using intimidation, corruption, and indifference, the unconventional attacker can subtly co-opt individual politicians and government officials in an attempt to gain political control of a
given geographical area or political enclave. Ultimately, such corruption may
lead to the emergence of a virtual, criminal state or political entity. 39
A truly non-state actor like al Qaeda cannot, in theory, be deterred
because it has no easily identifiable hierarchy or location. Without the possibility of deterrence there is not, in theory, anything that can limit its action.
Such actors are an abhorrence to governments simply because they cannot be
controlled, at least not by the traditional means that governments have at their
disposal. Nor are terrorists generally responsible to those they claim to represent, because they often operate from the perspective of a criminal organization. Thus, they are not accountable within the international system. 40
As a consequence, there is no formal commencement or termination
of conflicts; no specific territory to seize or hold; no credible government or
political actor with which to negotiate; and no guarantee that any agreement
between contending groups will be honored. In short, the battle space is ubiquitous. Consequently, power is no longer limited to military or police. These
unconventional non-state conflicts can best be identified by their ultimate objectives. They are characterized by the organized application of coercive military or non-military action—lethal or non-lethal, direct or indirect, or a
combination—intended to resist, oppose, control, or overthrow an existing
government or symbol of power.41

The Social Network Fit With the Current Problem
When considering the current Global War on Terrorism (specifically
the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq), the dynamic guiding this analysis is
that today’s environment favors the rise of networked organizations. It is a
much greater challenge to conduct a counterinsurgency in a traditionally networked society. Conducting a counterinsurgency implies the defeat of the insurgent fighters at every level. It entails the disruption of all auxiliary support
apparatus. This often requires identifying and arresting leaders and shadow
cadre inside the existing government. Finally, counterinsurgency forces must
disrupt the recruitment and indoctrination processes used to mobilize individuals and resources designed to overthrow a constituted government. 42
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A network analysis approach permits a more complete understanding of how such network based “enemy” systems behave and how that behavior is affected by connectivity. The intelligence background and link
diagrams that commanders build in their headquarters are rooted in the concepts of network analysis. The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
(IPB) is a vital command and staff function for any successful counterinsurgency. It begins with the commander’s estimate of how the enemy is
fighting as well as the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses. The IPB is complemented by a staff estimate. The IPB becomes a hypothesis confirmed or
denied by daily reconnaissance, surveillance, reporting, and command
assessments; it evolves. The purpose of the IPB is to assist the commander
in identifying targets, objectives, and friendly tactics. An IPB has a number
of components based on the level of threat the commander assesses. Link
diagramming of enemy cells and nodes is a key component in this process.
Terrain analysis is absolutely vital as is an understanding of a population’s
composition. Knowledge of the terrain and population provides commanders with an understanding of how to select the time and location for future
operations, as well as the tactics to be employed. All the component parts of
an effective IPB support offensive operations that keep the enemy reacting
to the commander’s initiative.
It is not uncommon in today’s environment to find that articles about
terrorists, criminals, and activists postulate that one grouping or another is organized as a network. However, a qualified analyst should be able to specify
in more exact terms an organization’s relationships. Among other things, assessment at this level should include showing exactly what type of network
design is being used; when and how members might act; where the leadership
resides; and how hierarchical dynamics may be integrated with network
systems. Social network analysts should be able to identify and portray the
details of a network’s structure, as they traditionally do when charting an adversary’s leadership, especially if they are analyzing terrorist and criminal organizations.43
A critical requirement on today’s battlefield is the ability to make an
assessment of the political and social architecture in a given area of operations, from both the friendly and enemy perspective. If analysts are to be successful they must do more than simply read field manuals. They need to
develop a detailed understanding of the complexity of warfare. Specifically,
it is imperative to obtain an understanding of how the enemy conducts his operations. Such an understanding provides a value-added to a network approach of analyzing what the enemy looks like and how he fights. Resistance
networks often do not behave like other social networks, but by asking what
kind of social network is a resistance network, one opens a window into that
28
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organization; affording an understanding of what that network may look like,
how it is connected, and how best to destabilize it.

Conclusion
The fight for the future makes daily headlines. Tomorrow’s battles are
not between armies of world powers, nor are the weapons employed large formations of tanks, planes, or ships. Rather, the combatants come from terrorist
networks such as Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda, Abu Musab al Zarqawi’s insurgents, and international drug cartels. They prefer to rely on indirect irregular or
guerilla warfare or episodic acts of terrorism, counting on these to wear down
the will and strength of their adversaries. The other protagonists—the ones
who often advance US interests—are networked, civil-society, activists fighting for democracy and human rights.44
In the Global War on Terrorism, one of the greatest challenges facing
the United States is the opposition of a fully mobilized, traditionally networked, tribalized enemy. This opposition is reflected in an insurgency that
possesses an unassailable base immune from direct attack. This unassailable
base is itself the social network, merging and diverging as the situation dictates.45 The answers to what motivates and sustains such an insurgency are not
readily found in traditional literature. Greater insight and better answers may
be found by reexamining the dynamics of traditionally networked tribes and
clans, or within the prescriptions provided by social network analysis.
It is in the concepts of social network analysis that we find the core
ideas of networks and linkages; the essence of the non-linear organization
that characterizes today’s insurgencies. It is by identifying patterns in these
non-linear forms that provides an understanding of the organization at hand.
The modern insurgency represents an evolved form of warfare that takes advantage of the capabilities that certain tribal societies demonstrate, the
pre-existing and affiliated social, economic, and military networks that are
easily adaptable to combat, and often extending across traditional boundaries
and borders. This is the reality of today’s global environment, and it will remain so far into the future.
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